THE SHADOW OF DRONES

THE SHADOW OF DRONES AND THE CLAIMS OF JUSTICE: A Response to the President’s Counter-terrorism speech and amended policy.

By Christian Iosso

On Thursday, May 23, President Obama changed and made more explicit the policies guiding his administration’s strategy of killing terror suspects by unmanned aircraft. That program, largely run by the CIA, has made approximately 425 strikes since 2002, killing over 3500 people. While also pledging renewed measures to close the unconstitutional prison at Guantanamo Bay, the President defended the constitutionality of the drone program as a form of just war still authorized by Congress’ open-ended approval of forceful response after 9/11. The President acknowledged that any action risks creating more enemies, but maintained overall that remotely piloted aircraft were an appropriate part of the “different kind of war” that has followed the end of the Cold War.

This response analyzes the speech (I) and then speaks to its importance for Christians concerned about the future shape of war (II).

I. It was a well prepared and delivered speech, including the President’s own tempered reaction to demonstrators just as he was invoking the “resiliency” of Americans in responding to disasters and threats. Watching the White House livestream, it was impossible to hear the protestor clearly, but her focus was both on the drones and on his still-restrained approach to closing Guantanamo, designed to appease at least some of his political opposition. It has been primarily the refusal of House Republicans to allow practicable detainee transfers out that has kept Guantanamo open. Yet Guantanamo is an open and shut case compared to the drone war that promises to be long, despite Obama’s expressed hope of an eventual end.

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However, the overall strategy of depending on warlords, contractors and corruption adopted during the initial invasion has been continued through the years of counterinsurgency and millions of dollars funneled through President Karzai by the CIA.
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In his introduction, the President reprised recent history, noting that “we must define the nature and scope of the struggle,” or it will define us. He claimed success in preventing large scale terrorism, gave an implicit critique of the Iraq war, stated frankly that the US had compromised its values its torture and detainment practices, justified “expanded surveillance” as a trade-off of security and privacy (not freedom or rights), and was pastoral about the costs: more than $1 Trillion (really more like $3 T ultimately), almost 7,000 dead US soldiers (not counting contractors), thousands and thousands of Afghans and Iraqis, and many veterans carrying “the shadows of battle back home.” The US was now at a “crossroads,” with the Afghan war being wound down, so that new policy can be made more out of wisdom than out of fear.

The contrast in style between Obama and his predecessor is major, with Obama’s use of accurate history going back to Founding Father James Madison’s warnings that freedom and war cannot coexist—warnings quoted in the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)’s current Peace Discernment study materials (p. 15 of the Interim Report). Obama explicitly repudiates the idea of a “war on Islam,” and understands that “force alone can’t make us safe.” And yet, there is no real explanation for why we will remain at war with a de-centralized and spreading enemy, nor for the “underlying grievances” beneath Arab “unrest” (not democratic aspirations?), and nor for the conventional condemnation of Hezbollah, for example, arguably a para-state representing (however well) interests other than ours. Still assumed is a vast network of bases overseas and, even though we need more foreign aid and diplomats, the risks they face are part of “the price of being the world’s most powerful nation.”  In this light, the scope of terrorism can look suspiciously like the scope of empire.

The President’s speech made four basic arguments: (a) drones are effective, largely neutralizing Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan; (b) drone use is legal, based on our being at war with Al Qaeda, a non-state actor; (c) drone war is just, because it is self-defense, last resort, and proportionate response, and; (d) drone use has been carried out accountably, with constant briefings of Congress, against appropriate targets, even when these are US citizens.

In relation to effectiveness, the President claims of success in Afghanistan-Pakistan depend on narrowing the focus to Al Qaeda rather than the endemic Taliban. The leadership of Al Qaeda, Bin Laden on down, has been largely eliminated. However, the overall strategy of depending on warlords, contractors and corruption adopted during the initial invasion has been continued through the years of counterinsurgency and millions of dollars funneled through President Karzai by the CIA. I do not see any US or NATO ally betting on a stable democracy in Afghanistan when our troops pull back to a few garrison bunkers. The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) and many mainline churches have advocated for ending the Afghan war.

The argument for the legality of drone use is partly technical, based on an extension of the authority of the President to wage war. The adoption of the new guidelines is designed to shore up this argument, even as the use of armed drones may actually be decreasing. The new guidelines, though still classified, would appear to include:

1. the gradual shift of drone warfare from the CIA to the military, which would parallel efforts to bring the CIA back to intelligence gathering rather than its paramilitary past 10 years of “The Way of the Knife,” to cite a recent book by Mark Mazzetti.
2. greater accountability to be developed with Congress. In additions to briefings, this could include a special court or independent oversight board, though the President noted drawbacks of both. (The secret FISA court model is actually very permissive, blocking few requests for wiretapping over its 30 plus years of use).
3. Greater emphasis on actual imminence of threat; the Administration was mocked for its loose definition of “imminent” in a white paper on the drone program leaked in February (See note below for comment on that white paper)
4. Consultation with partners and assurance that no other entity could deal with the problem, assuming that the individuals could not be captured, detained, and given some kind of due process, which in principle is the goal in each case.

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One summary question is whether the new kind of war is still defined by George W. Bush and the one-sided projection of force worldwide, justified as protection of “the homeland.”

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Obama claimed that the drone war has been just, arguing largely on grounds of proportionality, and not simply in terms of US soldiers’ lives saved. He argued strikes from drones inflict less damage on civilians than either conventional missiles or occupation forces. The issues of last resort, just authority, and what constitutes a battlefield were addressed indirectly. Imminent danger is the claim that targeted killing is the last resort one has for self-defense. Since terrorists are plotting all the time, wherever they are constitutes the battlefield. And the President has notoriously allowed it to be known that he himself reviewed the lists of possible targets, personally approving the killing of individuals without trial, appeal, or review. For many critics, this has made the President judge, jury, and executioner, debasing the office of President. But many drone killings have been so-called “signature strikes,” aimed at unknown men or gatherings that fit a profile for potential hostile activity, inviting the death of noncombatants.

The matter of accountability and legality was further addressed in the President’s speech by declassifying information on Anwar Al-Awlaki, the US-born cleric killed in Yemen. Leaving aside the other three US citizens killed, including Al-Alwaki’s 16 year old son in a separate drone strike, the White House alleged that this figure worked to send terrorists to the United States, as well as tape sermons urging violent jihad against America. Obama maintained that he was thus applying the same rules to Al-Alwaki as to the other terrorists targeted. Jeremy Scahill, speaking in the evening of May 23 on the Rachel Maddow show, noted that efforts to kill Al-Alwaki had preceded some of the terror support activities of which he was accused. [Scahill is author of Dirty Wars: The World As A Battlefield (2013)].

One summary question is whether the new kind of war is still defined by George W. Bush and the one-sided projection of force worldwide, justified as protection of “the homeland.” And does a more “comprehensive” counter-terrorism strategy still define the United States’ role in the world in primarily military terms, controlled by the Commander-in-chief’s definition of what constitutes an emergency? Is the President, in fact, making somewhat principled improvements to a tactic, while letting that tactic still dictate too much of our nation’s strategy or approach to the world? If so, we will continue to suffer from vision-deficit disorder. In the President’s defense, his combining the drone-rattling speech with the renewed effort to end the shame of Guantanamo may have left him constrained to stay in the realm of practical politics.

II. To turn now to more of the moral arguments: why should US Christians care? Are the individuals targeted not terrorists or outlaws, to be brought in alive or dead? Doesn’t the drone approach save us from the cost of detention and perhaps even the temptation to torture? Aren’t the drones a success story of our enormously bloated and inefficient military-industrial-security investment? Should we not be defined here primarily by our identity as Americans rather than as believers, and be grateful for our supremely powerful national security and surveillance state? Even if drone use creates resentment, aren’t many of the civilians more sympathetic to our opponents anyway? Less grandly, aren’t these drones helping get us out of the wars that were our over-reaction to 9/11?

Beyond our standing concerns for justice and peace, the Presbyterian General Assembly in 2006 reaffirmed that the church:

“supports the application of the Geneva Conventions to all enemy soldiers and the humane treatment with due process for all combatants held by U.S. forces anywhere in the world, and supports the provisions of the Bill of Rights and the principles of judicial review and congressional oversight over Executive branch operations, now including counterterrorism, Homeland Security, and domestic surveillance programs, both classified and publicly acknowledged.”

That statement comes from the Resolution Against Torture, but the same concern for due process holds for drones and other forms of counterterrorism. The Assembly in 2012 spoke more directly in its resolution on the Arab awakenings:

“The practices of undeclared war, including cyber attack, targeted killing by drone aircraft and other means, covert infiltration and “false flag” operations (that set up others for blame), expand government power, and threaten civil liberties as well as the national sovereignty of other nations.”

That resolution, For Human Rights and Civic Freedom: Movements for Democratic Change in the Arab World, sees the continuing agitation for liberty and fairness as a testimony to the need for a moral basis in US foreign policy. It also speaks directly to the threats faced by Christians in majority Muslim societies when Christian minorities are associated with US military ventures, support for dictators, and resented occupations. That resolution does not deny the threat of terrorism, but reaffirms the need for international law as a standard to guide all nations and lessen historic grievances. There was little in Obama’s speech about international law or the United Nations, and perhaps even less attention to what peace would look like in the countries where military drones are used. His images of victory (more than of peace) were focused on the United States.

Obama’s speech can be seen as an effort to make the drone component of our covert wars more public and more honest, and perhaps it is partly a response to the criticism of those who see it as inherently unconstitutional. This is the position of Micah Zenko, author of the report, Reforming U.S. Drone Policies, published in January 2013 by the Council on Foreign Relations. True, the actual guidelines or criteria for targeting and for calculating “imminent risk” remain classified, and the Obama administration values secrecy highly. Yet it is a form of public leadership that speaks to the accountability we all share for acts done even in our (whispered) name. The likelihood that drones will be used somewhat less may also speak to the dangers that will follow when other nations and non-state actors begin to use drones more. This may prompt more respect for national borders, even as drone use constitutes an on-going form of military intervention.

Is the drone war one more place where a Christian “realist” position is stretched to distortion to cover a basically nationalist, utilitarian and short-term calculus? We use our technological advantage rather than shedding our blood, but are we still using military means without clear military objectives?  It is not clear that our drone operations in Somalia, Yemen, Pakistan, and a variety of other places serve our security;  nor do they seem to curtail the grievous campaigns of suicide and other bombings that we see in too many countries. Even when the drones don’t hit civilians by accident, they may help regenerate new groups of patriotic and fundamentalist would-be martyrs. A different utilitarian argument might point out that global insecurity grows when death seems arbitrary and yet linked with certainty to America. Drones and “hellfire” missiles become our signature mark, hovering in the background of any understanding of our international role. The drono-sphere may become a kind of occupation from the air, high ground that is not a high road.

From The New York Times

Obviously, the national security state (Democratic or Republican) is willing to sacrifice human rights and democratic freedom in some measure; part of our spirit is caged at Guantanamo Bay, on that island we denounce for human rights abuses under the Castro brothers. Obama sees the contradiction, especially for those long-cleared but blocked from release for political reasons. As long as due process in open court is denied both the detainees in Guantanamo’s shadows and the alleged terrorists under drone shadows, the US unilateral claims to be exercising justice remain in question. But can we address the real causes of terrorism without much more extensive use of the international courts of justice already available, but not embraced by the US?

When targeted assassination by missile first became a practice in Israel for going after terrorists, diplomats in the first Bush administration and others across the world did not want to see this practice spread. There are always some civilians killed, and this kind of aerial justice was seen as more swift than sure. This response to the President’s drone defense does not dwell on the fact that we have killed US citizens with drones, but on the implications of regularizing that use of deadly power. Justice is rarely served by unilateral power, and fighting terror with another kind of terror does not seem the best foundation for lasting security. Given the important role that drones are playing in US military strategy and investment, the laws of war AND peace need to catch up fast. As for threatening “the national sovereignty of other nations,” as the Presbyterian policy states, certainly new but still secret arrangements for drone warfare continue to threaten our own democratic sovereignty.

NOTE ON THE FEBRUARY DRONE WHITE PAPER:

President Obama’s May 23 speech is a considerable advance on the ideas contained in a legal brief or white paper defending the drone program obtained by NBC in February. There are several summary critiques of that white paper, focused mainly on the claim that wide networks of people could all constitute “imminent” threats. Jane Mayer surveys many of the reactions to the leaked white paper, comparing the use of defenses of torture to the defense of targeted killings without due process, and asking how drones fit into just war considerations. Mayer and Juan Cole  points out that the Constitution rejects “bills of attainder,” which meant classifying people as outlaws without human rights. Habeus Corpus and other due process rights are meant to ensure a fair trial in open court for anyone the state may wish to kill or imprison indefinitely.